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Abstract 
This paper investigates the often-discussed over – and under – weighting of rare and extreme 
events – so called “black swans” – in decisions from experience (DFE). We first resolve the 
problem of lack of control over experienced probabilities by adjusting the common sampling 
paradigm of DFE. Our experimental design also controls for utility and uncertainty of 
experienced probabilities (ambiguity). This enables us to exactly identify the deviations from 
Expected Utility due to over – or under – weighting of probabilities under risk. Our results 
confirm the well-known gap between DFE and traditional decisions from description (DFD) 
but do not provide evidence for underweighting of small probabilities in DFE. We found that 
experience leads to less pronounced overweighting of small probabilities, and less pronounced 
underweighting of large probabilities. Thus, our findings suggest a clear de-biasing effect of 
sampling experience: it attenuates – rather than reverses – the commonly found inverse S-
shaped probability weighting in DFD.  
 
Key Words: decisions from experience; decisions under risk; probability weighting; 
rare outcomes 
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Are Black Swans Really Ignored?  Re-examining Decisions from Experience 
Studies of decisions from experience (henceforth, DFE) investigate decision situations 
in which people rely on personal experiences when facing uncertainty. Decision makers often 
have no access to possible choice outcomes, let alone to the corresponding probabilities.  
Instead, they make decisions based on the past observations in their memory. DFE better 
captures real life decisions than traditional ‘Decisions from Description’ (henceforth, DFD) 
where payoffs and probabilities are fully specified, which rarely happens in real life. In the 
usual sampling paradigm of DFE (Hertwig et al. 2004), subjects learn about unknown payoff 
distributions by drawing samples with replacement. With merely these cases in memory, they 
make their final decisions.  
Since Barron & Erev (2003) and Hertwig et al. (2004), an intriguing discrepancy 
between the two decision paradigms, which is called the DFE-DFD gap, has received plenty 
of attention. The common view in the DFE literature is that people make decisions from 
experience as if they are underweighting rare and extreme events, so called “black swans”, 
which are often overweighted under the DFD paradigm (for a review, see Hertwig & Erev, 
2009). This pattern implies a reversal of the inverse S-shaped probability weighting that has 
been documented by many empirical studies under DFD (Abdellaoui 2000; Bleichrodt & Pinto 
2000; Bruhin et al. 2010; Booij et al. 2010; Fehr-Duda et al. 2006; Gonzalez & Wu 1999; 
Tversky & Kahneman 1992; Wu & Gonzalez 1996)1. 
The DFE literature has suggested that the DFE-DFD gap is a robust empirical 
phenomenon. Although the under-sampling of rare events due to reliance on small samples 
(sampling error) partly explains the early findings of the gap (Fox & Hadar 2006; Hadar & Fox 
                                                          
1 See Wakker (2010), section 7.1 for a survey. A comprehensive list of DFD literature supporting inverse S is 
also provided in the web appendix. 
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2009, Hertwig et al. 2004), later studies have shown that it does not provide a complete account 
(Barron & Ursino 2013; Camilleri & Newell 2009; Hau et al. 2008; Hau et al. 2010; Ungemach 
et al. 2009). Importantly, unlike risk with known probabilities in DFD, the ambiguity in DFE 
stemming from unknown outcome probabilities – and even from unknown set of possible 
outcomes – is another cause of the gap (Abdellaoui et al. 2011; Glockner et al. 2016; Kemel & 
Travers 2016).   
Despite the robustness of the DFE-DFD gap, whether it actually amounts to a reversal 
of the inverse S-shaped probability weighting is still unclear in the literature. In addition to the 
sampling error and ambiguity, there are two extra confounds that render the inferences about 
probability weighting problematic in DFE studies. The first confound concerns an aggregation 
problem when there is a lack of control over the sampling experience of subjects. Because of 
the random nature of the sampling process – where the sampling is made with replacement and 
subjects decide when to stop sampling – each subject relies on her own distinct subjective 
experiences. Importantly, this heterogeneity in experience at the individual level causes 
potential distortions at the aggregate level due to averaging artifacts (see Estes 1956; Estes 
2002; Sidman 1952).  
The second confound concerns the role of utilities. Early studies in the DFE literature 
argue about the underweighting of rare outcomes in an “as-if” sense. Specifically, the 
underweighting is typically inferred from a preference for sure gains over expected-value-
equivalent lotteries involving unlikely gains (for example, a preference for a sure $1 over a 
lottery with 10% chance of winning $10 and $0 otherwise).  However, the absolute weighting 
of probabilities stays unclear as the aversion to unlikely gains may as well be due to concave 
utility (possibly coupled with an unbiased probability weighting) as it may be due to an 
underweighting of unlikely events. Later studies controlled for utilities by estimating them 
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together with probability weighting functions using a parametric approach. Nevertheless, one 
concern about simultaneous parametric estimations is the potential interactions between the 
parameters of utility and probability weighting functions (Gonzalez & Wu 1999 pp.152; 
Scheibehenne & Pachur 2015 pp. 403-404; Stott 2006 pp. 112; Zeisberger et al. 2012). 
This paper provides a measurement of probability weighting under DFE by resolving 
the aforementioned problems, and thus improving validity. First, we used Barron & Ursino’s 
(2013) adjustment of the sampling paradigm to obtain a control over the sampling experience 
of each individual subject. Specifically, all of our subjects were required to carry out complete 
sampling from finite outcome distributions without replacement. Hence, they acquired the 
sampling information that matched with the objective probabilities without any sampling error. 
Second, this way we also avoid the confounding effects of unknown probability attitudes, well 
documented in the literature (Ellsberg 1961; Trautmann & van de Kuilen 2015). Third, we 
avoided the aggregation problem as explained in more detail later.   
Fourth, we measured probability weighting by a rigorous two-stage methodology 
(Abdellaoui 2000; Bleichrodt & Pinto 2000; Etchart-Vincent 2004, 2009; Qiu & Steiger 2011). 
In particular, this controlled for the utility curvature in the first stage. Thus, each choice in the 
second stage directly indicated overweighting or underweighting of probabilities. The 
experimental setup enabled us to identify the direction and the magnitude of the deviations 
from expected utility (henceforth, EU), without relying on any parametric assumptions about 
probability weighting. Further, parametric estimations were implemented as a supplement of 
our nonparametric measures.   
Deviations from EU due to Probability Weighting 
We restrict our attention to probability-contingent binary prospects in the gain domain. 
A binary prospect of winning 𝛼 with probability 𝑝 and 𝛽 otherwise is denoted 𝛼𝑝𝛽. Under rank 
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dependent utility (henceforth RDU), for  𝛼 ≽ 𝛽 ≽ 0, 𝛼𝑝𝛽  is evaluated by  𝑤(𝑝)𝑈(𝛼) +
(1 − 𝑤(𝑝))𝑈(𝛽) where 𝑈  is the utility function and 𝑤  the probability weighting function. 
Throughout, we assume binary RDU. Most other non-EU theories, in particular both versions 
of Prospect Theory for gains (henceforth PT, Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & 
Kahneman 1992), and Gul’s (1991) Disappointment Aversion Theory, agree with the binary 
RDU in the evaluation of binary prospects (Observation 7.11.1 in Wakker 2010, pp. 231). 
Hence, our analysis applies to all these theories. 
RDU deviates from EU when 𝑤(. ) is not the identity. Thus, the risk attitude of a 
decision maker depends not only on the utility curvature as in EU but also on probability 
weighting. The common finding with the DFD paradigm is an inverse S-shaped (first concave 
and overweighting, then convex and underweighting) probability weighting function (Figure 
1).2 The steepness of the probability weighting function at both end points implies that the rare 
and extreme outcomes in general receive too much decision weight. When a rare outcome with 
probability 𝑝  is desirable, its impact given by 𝑤(𝑝)  is overweighted because of the 
overweighting of small probabilities (𝑤(𝑝) > 𝑝 ). This increases the attractiveness of the 
prospect, and leads to risk seeking. Similarly, when a rare outcome with probability 𝑝  is 
unfavorable, its impact given by 1 − 𝑤(1 − 𝑝) is overweighted because of the underweighting 
of large probabilities (𝑤(1 − 𝑝) < 1 − 𝑝). This decreases the attractiveness of the prospect, 
and leads to risk aversion.  
The pattern of inverse S-shaped probability weighting is commonly interpreted as the 
reflection of both cognitive and motivational deviations from EU (Gonzalez & Wu 1999). On 
the one hand, the simultaneous overweighting and underweighting of extreme probabilities 
                                                          
2 For evidence against inverse S, see Qiu & Steiger (2011), van de Kuilen & Wakker (2011) and Krawczyk 
(2015). A more complete list of evidence against inverse S in the DFD literature is provided in the web 
appendix. 
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implies insufficient sensitivity to intermediate probabilities. This effect is called likelihood 
insensitivity, and points to cognitive limitations in discriminating different levels of 
uncertainty. On the other hand, underweighting of moderate probabilities (such as, 𝑤(0.5) <
0.5) suggests a pessimistic attitude towards risk in the major part of the probability domain. 
This effect points to motivational deviations from EU.  
Figure 1. Inverse S-shaped probability weighting function 
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The DFE-DFD Gap 
Hertwig & Erev (2009) considers three DFE paradigms: partial feedback, full feedback, 
and sampling paradigms. The essential feature shared by all three DFE paradigms is that 
subjects learn about unknown payoff structures by solely relying on their experiences. In the 
partial feedback paradigm, subjects  make repeated choices and receive feedback about the 
realized outcomes (Barron & Erev 2003). In the full feedback paradigm, subjects also learn 
about the forgone outcomes from the unchosen options (Yechiam & Busemeyer 2006). 
Differently, the sampling paradigm involves a single – rather than repeated – choice preceded 
by a purely exploratory and inconsequential sampling period in which subjects draw outcomes 
from unknown payoff distributions with replacement, usually as many times as they wish 
(Hertwig et al. 2004; Weber et al. 2004).  
All three paradigms lead to similar behavioral patterns with an apparent underweighting 
of rare and extreme outcomes, which contradicts the common empirical findings from DFD. 
Although the empirical findings with all three paradigms are alike, the two feedback paradigms 
are inherently different from the sampling paradigm (for an empirical comparison of three DFE 
paradigms, see Camilleri & Newell 2011b, also see the theoretical discussion of Gonzalez & 
Dutt 2011). In particular, repeated choices in the two feedback paradigms, as opposed to single 
decisions in the sampling paradigm, induce long-run payoff considerations due to accumulating 
income (Wulff et al. 2015). This predicts more expected value maximization in repeated 
choices by the law of large numbers (Keren & Wagenaar 1987; Lopes 1982; Tversky & Bar 
Hillel 1983). Furthermore, distinct psychological factors, such as reinforcement learning, and 
the hot stove effect3, also play a role in repeated decisions with feedback (March 1996; March 
                                                          
3 The hot stove effect was first introduced by Mark Twain based on his observation that if a cat jumped on a hot 
stove, then she would never jump on a hot stove again. However, the cat would never jump even on a cold 
stove. 
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& Denrell 2001). Erev & Barron (2005) reviews the effects that lead to deviations from 
expected value maximization in repeated choice paradigms. The sampling paradigm, on the 
other hand, is more comparable with the DFD paradigm as both involve single decisions. 
Therefore, the intriguing gap between the sampling paradigm and DFD has received most 
attention in the DFE literature. The current paper also focuses on the sampling paradigm of 
DFE.  
The Information Asymmetry Account and the Sampling Error 
The main premise of the DFE-DFD gap is that the way in which the information about 
uncertain prospects is acquired matters. In other words, experience matters (Hau et al. 2008). 
Fox & Hadar (2006) and Hadar & Fox (2009) argue that there is an important caveat associated 
with this premise. DFE and DFD differ from each other not only in terms of the way that the 
information is acquired but also in terms of the information available to subjects. Indeed, 
whereas the objective probabilities and outcomes are known in DFD, they remain partially 
unknown in DFE. This means that subjects in DFE have to rely on their own subjective 
probability judgments based on the sampling information they acquire. Importantly, subjective 
probabilities are prone to diverge from objective probabilities due to potential distortions either 
in the sampling process or in subjective probability judgments. This generates an information 
asymmetry between DFE and DFD. Hadar & Fox (2006) indicates that the underweighting of 
rare outcomes observed by Hertwig et al. (2004) is almost entirely caused by the sampling error 
as subjects often under-observe, or even never observe the rare outcomes due to reliance on 
small samples. On the other hand, judgment error and underestimation of rare outcomes are 
not found to be significant sources of the gap.    
Later studies test this information asymmetry account of the DFE-DFD gap by reducing 
or completely eliminating the sampling error. Several papers demonstrated that the gap is 
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actually persistent when the subjects are obliged to draw large or even representative samples 
from underlying probability distributions (Barron & Ursino 2013; Camilleri & Newell 2009; 
Hau et al. 2008; Hau et al. 2010; Ungemach et al. 2009). Moreover, subjective probability 
judgments are usually found well calibrated although their correlation with observed relative 
frequencies is imperfect (Camilleri & Newell 2009; Hau et al. 2008; Ungemach et al. 2009, but 
see also Barron & Yechiam 2009). These findings suggest that the DFE-DFD gap is not just 
information asymmetry, but indeed a robust psychological phenomenon. 
DFE and DFD: Two Different Sources of Uncertainty 
Although drawing large or representative samples solve the problem of systematic 
sampling error, the uncertainty about the outcome probabilities as well as the set of possible 
outcomes remains.  This residual uncertainty makes DFE a case of ambiguity whereas DFD is 
a case of risk. Several studies show that the gap is reduced or even reversed by manipulating 
the degree of ambiguity in DFE. In addition to information provision regarding the certainty or 
possibility of outcomes, Glockner et al. (2016) also points out the impact of the type of 
problems used in the experiments, which may lead diverse context dependent subjective 
beliefs.  
In a design that is intermediate between DFE and DFD, Abdellaoui et al. (2011b) and 
Kemel & Travers (2016) finds inverse-S pattern in DFE with more pronounced pessimism than 
in DFD. This result reflects ambiguity aversion. Kellen & Pachur (2006) and Glockner et al. 
(2016) find even more pronounced likelihood insensitivity in DFE. These findings are 
consistent with previous ambiguity literature (Abdellaoui et al. 2011a; Fox & Tversky 1998; 
Tversky & Fox 1995; Wakker 2004).  
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Problem of Aggregation in the Sampling Paradigm 
As explained before, experienced probabilities differ from objective probabilities either 
due to sampling error or due to judgment errors. As a result, each subject makes choices based 
on her own subjectively experienced probabilities. Notably, as the aggregation of such 
individual choices amounts to taking the average of the weightings – rather than the weighting 
of the average – of experienced probabilities, the concave-convex curvature of the inverse S-
shaped probability weighting function may lead to an erroneous DFE-DFD gap.    
To illustrate, assume that all subjects in DFE and DFD have the same probability 
weighting function depicted in figure 2a, which is concave and overweight 10% probability of 
a rare and favorable outcome. For the sake of the example, also assume that each subject in 
DFE draws only 5 times, in which half of the subjects never observe the rare outcome, and the 
other half observe it once. Therefore, assuming that the subjects do not commit a judgment 
error, the experienced probabilities will be either 0% or 20%. In this case, aggregating choices 
over all subjects’ amounts to averaging the weightings of 0% and 20% rather than weighting 
the average 10%. This makes the aggregate choice appear as if 10% is underweighted due to 
concavity whereas in reality it is overweighted (see figure 2a).  
The same effect, although probably smaller in size, also applies when there is no 
sampling error but only judgment error. Figure 2b illustrates the case where the subjects in 
DFE accurately observe 10% probability, however, half of them underestimate it as 5% 
whereas the other half overestimate it as 15%. As a result, the aggregate choice appears as if 
10% is weighted less in DFE than in DFD (see figure 2b). 
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Figure 2. Distortions due to aggregation 
 
By the dual effect, convex probability weighting for large probabilities moves 
aggregate choices in the direction of overweighting (see figures 2c and 2d). Together with the 
concavity for small probabilities, this implies a reversed or attenuated inverse S at the aggregate 
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level, which is what the DFE-DFD gap also suggests. This theoretical conjecture is indeed 
indirectly supported by the findings of Rakow et al. (2008). In their yoked design, each subject 
in the DFE treatment is matched with a subject in the DFD treatment who receives the same 
sampling information in description format. Thus, equating the heterogeneity of the sampling 
information across the two treatments, they observe that the DFE-DFD gap is almost 
completely eliminated (also see the discussion of Hau et al. 2010 on the amplification effect in 
yoked design).  
Underweighting or not? 
Along with the aforementioned issues, the controversy about the DFE-DFD gap 
concerns whether it can actually give rise to underweighting of rare outcomes. Early studies of 
DFE infer underweighting from aggregate patterns of risk seeking and/or risk aversion. Rakow 
& Newell (2010, pp.6) points out that the gap often amounts only to a discrepancy in risk 
attitudes (e.g. different degrees of risk seeking for small probability gains), suggesting a less 
pronounced overweighting in DFE compared to DFD, rather than an absolute underweighting. 
Moreover, even a reversal in risk attitudes (e.g. risk aversion for small probability gains in DFE 
as opposed to risk seeking in DFD) may not be sufficient to conclude about the absolute 
underweighting of rare outcomes under DFE as a concave utility along with an unbiased 
weighting might also lead to risk aversion. 
Later studies report quantitative estimations of probability weighting under DFE, also 
by controlling the role of utilities. However, the present evidence on the shape of probability 
weighting functions is mixed. Hau et al. (2008) and Ungemach et al. (2009) document linear 
weighting and underweighting respectively, based on the same set of problems used by Hertwig 
et al. (2004). Among those studies that used larger problem sets, Abdellaoui et al. (2011b), 
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Kemel & Travers (2016), and Kopsacheilis (2016) report less pronounced overweighting 
whereas Barron & Ursino (2013) and Frey et al. (2015) report underweighting. Other recent 
studies by Glockner et al. (2016) and Kellen et al. (2016) reports even more pronounced 
overweighting under DFE. Differences in methodologies and in manipulations of the sampling 
paradigm to cope with sampling error are possible sources of the discrepancy. For a further 
discussion of these discrepant results, see a recent meta-analysis by Wulff et al. (2016). 
Our experiment aims to clarify the controversy by resolving the aforementioned four 
confounds. Different from previous studies, our adjustment of the sampling paradigm turns the 
DFE-DFD comparison into a pure comparison of two cases of risk that differ only in terms of 
information acquisition, being experience or description. 
Method 
Our experimental procedure consists of two stages. In the first stage, the utility function 
of each subject is elicited using the trade-off (TO) method of Wakker and Deneffe (1996). The 
TO method is a well-established method that has been commonly used in studies investigating 
probability weighting (Abdellaoui 2000; Abdellaoui et al. 2005; Bleichrodt & Pinto 2000; 
Etchart-Vincent 2004, 2009; Qiu & Steiger 2011). The method entails the elicitation of a 
standard sequence of outcomes that are equally spaced in utility units. The elicitation procedure 
consists of a series of adaptive indifference relations. For two fixed gauge outcomes G and g, 
and a selected starting outcome 𝑥𝑜 with 𝑥0 > 𝐺 > 𝑔, 𝑥1 > 𝑥0 is elicited such that the subject 
is indifferent between prospects 𝑥1𝑝𝑔 and 𝑥0𝑝𝐺. Then, 𝑥1 is used as an input to elicit 𝑥2 > 𝑥1 
such that the subject is indifferent between 𝑥2𝑝𝑔 and 𝑥1𝑝𝐺. This procedure is repeated 𝑛 times 
in order to obtain the standard sequence (𝑥0, … , 𝑥𝑛) with indifferences 𝑥𝑖+1𝑝𝑔 ~ 𝑥𝑖𝑝𝐺 for 0 ≤
𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 − 1. Under RDU, these indifferences result in 𝑈(𝑥1) − 𝑈(𝑥0) = 𝑈(𝑥2) − 𝑈(𝑥1) = ⋯ =
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𝑈(𝑥𝑛−1) − 𝑈(𝑥𝑛)  (for the derivation, see Appendix A). A remarkable feature of the TO 
method is that it elicits these equalities irrespective of what the probability weighting is. 
Therefore, it is robust against most distortions due to non-expected utility maximization.    
Once the standard sequence of outcomes has been obtained, we obtain the utility 
function of each individual by parametrically estimating the power specification 𝑈(𝑥) = 𝑥𝛼 
with 𝛼 > 0 after scaling of 𝑥𝑖𝑠 as 𝑥𝑖 =
𝑥𝑖−𝑥0
𝑥𝑛−𝑥0
 . We use parametric estimation in order to smooth 
out errors, and better capture the utility curvature. The parameter 𝛼 is calculated using an 
ordinary least squares regression without intercept,  log(𝑈(𝑥)) = 𝛼 log(𝑥) + 𝜀  where  𝜀 ∼
𝑁(0, 𝜎2). 
In the second stage of our procedure, we measure probability weighting using several 
binary choice questions. The questions are constructed based on the subject-specific outcome 
sequences obtained from the first stage. Subjects choose between a risky prospect 𝑥𝑘𝑞𝑥𝑗 and a 
sure outcome 𝑠𝑞, where 𝑥𝑘 and 𝑥𝑗 are two distinct elements of the elicited outcome sequence 
with 𝑥𝑘 > 𝑥𝑗, and 𝑠𝑞 is equal to the certainty equivalent of 𝑥𝑘𝑞𝑥𝑗 under EU.  
𝑠𝑞 = 𝑈
−1[𝑞𝑈(𝑥𝑘) + (1 − 𝑞)𝑈(𝑥𝑗)].                                                         (1) 
That is, 𝑠𝑞  would be equivalent to 𝑥𝑘𝑞𝑥𝑗  if the subject with the given utility did not weigh 
probabilities. Hence by construction, the following logical equivalences hold for given 
preference relations under RDU.  
𝑥𝑘𝑞𝑥𝑗 ≺ 𝑠𝑞  ⇔ 𝑤(𝑞) < 𝑞 (𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 )                                   (2)  
𝑥𝑘𝑞𝑥𝑗 ∼ 𝑠𝑞  ⇔ 𝑤(𝑞) = 𝑞 (𝐸𝑈)                                                                 (3) 
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𝑥𝑘𝑞𝑥𝑗 ≻ 𝑠𝑞  ⇔ 𝑤(𝑞) > 𝑞 (𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔)                                         (4) 
Because we do not allow indifference in our experiment, each individual choice will 
reveal either overweighting or underweighting of probability  𝑞 . Our method makes the 
deviations from EU observable at the aggregate level. For instance, an overweighting of 𝑞 can 
be detected when the majority of subjects choose the risky 𝑥𝑘𝑞𝑥𝑗 as in (4).  
Barron & Ursino (2013) also investigates the DFE-DFD gap under risk (their 
experiment 1) similar to our study by using a different two-stage experimental procedure. Their 
procedure replicates the well-known DFE-DFD gap. However, it does not make inferences 
about the actual over- or under- weighting of rare outcomes under DFE and DFD4.  
The Experiment 
Subjects and Incentives 
The experiment was performed at the ESE-EconLab at Erasmus University in 5 group 
sessions. Subjects were 89 Erasmus University students from various academic disciplines 
(average age 23 years, 40 female). All subjects were recruited from the pool of subjects who 
had never participated in any economic experiment in our lab before, to avoid experienced 
subjects in TO method. We paid each subject a €5 participation fee. In addition, at the end of 
each session, we randomly selected two subjects who could play out one of their randomly 
drawn choices for real. The ten subjects who played for real received €60.70 on average. Over 
the whole experiment, the average payment per subject was €12.37.  
                                                          
4 Their first stage obtains an indifference relation under DFD which implies 𝑤(1 − 𝑞) ∗ 𝑈(𝑋) = 𝑤(𝑞) ∗ 𝑈($40), 
where the probability 𝑞 is either 0.1 or 0.2, depending on the treatment, and 𝑋 is elicited. Their second stage looks 
at deviations from this indifference under DFE and DFD. Their findings indicate deviations only under DFE, 
suggesting less weighting of 𝑞 and/or more weighting of (1 − 𝑞) under DFE, i.e. 𝑤(1 − 𝑞) ∗ 𝑈(𝑋) > 𝑤(𝑞) ∗
𝑈($40), consistent with the DFE-DFD gap.    
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Procedure 
The experiment was run on computers. Subjects were separated by wooden panels to 
minimize interaction. To prevent the impact of variations in memory limitations, all subjects 
were provided with paper and pen in case they wished to take notes.  Before they started with 
the main parts of the experiment, they read the general instructions with detailed information 
about the payment procedure, the user interface, and the type of questions they would face. The 
subjects could ask questions at any time during the experiment. The experiment consisted of 
two successive stages without a break in between. Each stage started with its corresponding 
instructions, and several training questions to familiarize subjects with the stimuli (copies of 
the instructions are provided in Web Appendix). Each session took 45 minutes on average, 
including the payment phase after the experiment. 
Stimuli 
Stage 1: measuring utility. In the first stage of the experiment, a standard sequence 
of outcomes was elicited using the TO method. We measured 𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, 𝑥4, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑥5 from the 
following five indifferences, with 𝑝 = 0.33, 𝐺 = 17, 𝑔 = 9, and 𝑥0 = 24: 
𝟐𝟒𝒑𝑮~ 𝒙𝟏𝒑𝒈,  𝑥1𝑝𝐺 ~ 𝑥2𝑝𝑔,  𝒙𝟐𝒑𝑮 ~ 𝒙𝟑𝒑𝒈,  𝑥3𝑝𝐺 ~ 𝑥4𝑝𝑔,  𝒙𝟒𝒑𝑮 ~ 𝒙𝟓𝒑𝒈. 
Our choice of the fixed parameters 𝑝, 𝐺, 𝑔, 𝑥0 was fine-tuned based on a pilot session so that 
the elicitation yields a well-spaced outcome sequence giving reliable certainty equivalent 
values of 𝑠𝑞 in equation 1.  
Indifferences were obtained by a bisection method requiring 7 iterations for each  𝑥𝑖 . In 
addition, the last iteration of one randomly chosen 𝑥𝑖 was repeated at the end of stage 1, in 
order to test the reliability of the indifferences. Hence, subjects answered a total of 36 questions 
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in this part. The bisection iteration procedure is described in Appendix B. The prospects were 
presented on screen as in Figure 3.  
In this part, risk was generated by two ten-faced dice each generating one digit of a 
random number from 00 to 99. The outcome of prospects depended on the result of two dice 
physically rolled by subjects in case the question was played for real at the end of the 
experiment. 
 
Figure 3. Choice situation in the TO part 
 
 
Stage 2: DFD and DFE. Before the start of the second part, each subject was randomly 
assigned to one of the two treatments: DFE or DFD. Subjects in both treatments answered 7 
subject-specific binary choice questions. Each question entailed a choice between a risky 
prospect 𝑥5𝑞𝑥1 and the safe prospect 𝑠𝑞 as described in the method section. Note that both 𝑥1 
and 𝑥5  were endogenously determined, and varied between subjects.
5  Values of 𝑠𝑞  were 
                                                          
5 We used the elicited 𝑥1 as the minimum outcome of the risky prospects to avoid problems related to the 
extreme behavior of power utility near its origin (Wakker 2008), i.e. 𝑥0 in our design. In particular, for 𝛼 < 1, 
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always rounded to the nearest integer. The seven probabilities used for the investigation of 
probability weighting were 0.05, 0.10, 0,20, 0.50, 0.80, 0.90 𝑎𝑛𝑑 0.95. Within each treatment, 
the orders of the seven questions were counterbalanced. The position of the risky prospect and 
the safe prospect were also randomized in each question. 
Prospects were represented by Ellsberg-type urns containing 20 balls with different 
monetary values attached to them. This means that all the aforementioned probabilities were 
fractions of 20; i.e. 5% is 1 out of 20, 10% is 2 out of 20, etc. The two treatments differed 
from each other in terms of how the contents of the urns were learnt. In the DFD treatment, 
the contents of the urns were explicitly described to the subject. Figure 4 shows a screen shot 
of a choice situation for DFD.  
Figure 4. Choice situation in DFD
 
 
Subjects in the DFE treatment were initially given no information about the contents of 
the urns except the total number of balls. They could only learn about the outcome 
                                                          
the slope of the power utility converges to infinity as 𝑥 tends to the origin. This implies extreme risk aversion 
near the origin. Similarly, 𝛼 > 1 implies extreme risk seeking near the origin. 
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compositions of the urns by sampling each and every ball one-by-one without replacement, 
and observing the monetary values attached. Figure 5 shows a screen shot of the sampling 
phase in the DFE treatment. Subjects sampled balls from urns by clicking “Sample left” or 
“Sample right” on the screen. Each time, the monetary outcome attached to the ball sampled 
was shown to the subject for 1.5 seconds, and then disappeared. Subject could sample in their 
own speed, in whichever order they preferred, and switch as many times as they wanted, but 
they could only proceed to the choice stage after sampling all the balls in both urns.  
 
Figure 5. Sampling stage in DFE 
 
 
Figure 6 shows the screen shot of the choice stage in DFE. In case a question in this 
part was drawn for the payment at the end of the experiment, the experimenters physically 
created the relevant urn seen on the screen by filling an opaque urn with 20 ping-pong balls 
painted to dark blue or light blue, each associated with the payoffs in question (see Figure 4). 
Then, the subject drew a ball from the urn, which determined her payoffs. 
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Figure 6. Choice stage in DFE 
Subjects in the DFD treatment faced 21 extra questions following the main set of 7 
questions to equalize the length of the two treatments. These extra questions were for another 
research project. 
Results 
Reliability and Consistency of Utility Elicitation 
In the TO part, each subject repeated one choice faced in one of the five elicitations. 
The repeated choice was randomly selected among the last steps of the iterations. Because the 
subjects were very close to indifference at the last step, this was the strongest test of 
consistency.  Subjects made the same choice in 70.8% of the cases. Reversal rates up to one 
third are common in the literature (Stott 2006; Wakker et al. 1994). Especially, if the closeness 
to indifference is taken into account, our reversal rates are satisfactory. Among the reversed 
cases, repeated indifferences were higher than the original indifference values in 42.3% of the 
times, which did not indicate any systematic pattern (p=0.56, two-sided binomial). Overall, 
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repeated indifference values did not differ from original elicitations (p=0.44, Wilcoxon sign-
rank). 
In our data, one subject reached the possible lower bound of  𝑥𝑖 ’s in all 5 cases. 
Consequently, her standard sequence was not well spaced enough for the estimations of 𝑠𝑞 with 
Equation (1).6 We excluded this subject from the following analysis. The analysis with this 
subject included does not alter our conclusions. The same problem was not observed with any 
other subject.  
Utility Functions 
Table 1 gives the descriptive statistics for the elicited outcome sequence. The parameter 
𝛼 of the power utility u(x) = xα was estimated at the individual level by ordinary least squares 
regression. The average 𝑅2 over all individual utility estimations was 0.985 which indicated 
that our estimations fit the data well.  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the elicited outcome sequence (N=88) 
  Mean S. Dev Min Median Max 
𝒙𝟎 24.00 0.00 24.00 24.00 24.00 
𝒙𝟏 60.36 23.48 30.00 58.00 118.00 
𝒙𝟐 90.36 42.58 36.00 80.00 212.00 
𝒙𝟑 125.23 65.89 46.00 102.00 306.00 
𝒙𝟒 164.18 91.13 52.00 134.00 400.00 
𝒙𝟓 204.14 116.25 58.00 160.00 494.00 
                                                          
6 She got (𝑥5 − 𝑥1 = 8). Therefore, the resulted estimations, 𝑠0.05 = 𝑥1 and 𝑠0.95 = 𝑥5, made the preference for 
𝑥50.05𝑥1  over 𝑠0.05 and the preference for 𝑠0.95 over 𝑥50.95𝑥1 trivial because of the domination of the safe or the 
risky prospect. 
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𝜶 1.05 0.36 0.41 0.99 2.65 
 
The summary statistics for the mean and median α are reported in the last row of Table 
1. The aggregate data did not deviate from linearity (p=0.92, Wilcoxon sign-rank). Although 
the mean alpha suggested slight convexity, this was due to the outliers in our data. Three 
subjects exhibited extreme convexity with 𝛼 > 2, and the Skewness/Kurtosis test rejected the 
normality of the distribution of 𝛼′s (p=0.00). Utilities did not differ across the two treatments 
(p=0.84, Wilcoxon rank-sum).  
Our data suggested slightly more evidence for concavity at the individual level. Based 
on the 𝛼 parameters that were significantly different than 1 at 5% significance level, 30 subjects 
exhibited concavity (𝛼 < 1), and 23 subjects exhibited convexity (𝛼 > 1). The proportions of 
concave and convex utilities did not differ from each other (p=0.41, two-sided binomial).  
 
Probability Weighting: DFE vs. DFD 
Aggregate data. In this section, we report the aggregate choices in the direction of 
overweighting and underweighting according to (2) and (4) in the Method section. The 
proportions of overweighting and underweighting of small and large probabilities are given in 
Figures 7 and 8 respectively.  
The aggregate choices replicated the common DFE-DFD gap at the extreme 
probabilities. The gap was significant at 0.95 (p=0.02, 𝜒2); and marginally significant at 0.10, 
and 0.90  (p=0.06, and p=0.07 respectively,  𝜒2 ). It was always in the expected direction, 
alleviating the overweighting of small probabilities and the underweighting of large 
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probabilities under DFE. The gap at probability 0.05 was not significant (p=0.20, 𝜒2), although 
the trend suggested reduced overweighting in DFE. There was also no apparent DFE-DFD gap 
in the middle range, 0.20 ≤ 𝑞 ≤ 0.80 (p=0.35, p=0.92, and p=0.37 for 𝑞 = 0.20, 0.50, and 
0.80 respectively, 𝜒2). 
In what follows, we focus on absolute overweighting and underweighting of 
probabilities under DFD and DFE. We first test the deviations from unbiased weighting in 
either directions with the classical two-sided binomial tests for proportions. In addition, to 
interpret the relative evidence for overweighting and underweighting, we report Bayes factors 
for the null hypothesis of overweighting against the alternative hypothesis of underweighting. 
Bayes factors state the relative evidence for the null hypothesis. For instance, a Bayes factor of 
10 indicates that overweighting is 10 times more likely than underweighting for the given 
probability. Following Jeffreys (1961), a Bayes factor between 3 and 10 is interpreted as “some 
evidence”, a Bayes factor between 10 and 30 is interpreted as “strong evidence”, and a Bayes 
factor larger than 30 is interpreted as “very strong evidence” for the null of overweighting. 
Similarly, Bayes factors between 0.1 and 0.33, between 0.1 and 0.03, and less than 0.03 are 
interpreted respectively as “some evidence”, “strong evidence”, and “very strong evidence” for 
the alternative hypothesis of underweighting.7 
As shown in Figure 7, for small probabilities, we found a marginally significant 
deviation from unbiased weighting at 0.05 (p=0.07) under DFD. Interpreting from Bayes 
factors, there was strong evidence of overweighting 0.05 (BF=28.04), some evidence of 
overweighting 0.1 (BF=8.54) and some evidence of underweighting 0.2 (BF=0.02). Under 
DFE, we only found a significantly biased weighting at 0.2 (p=0.03). Interpreting from Bayes 
                                                          
7 Bayes factors are computed with the package BayesFactor in R (Morey, Rouder, Jamil & R Core Team, 2015) 
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factors, there was strong evidence of underweighting 0.2 (BF=0.02) and some evidence of 
underweighting 0.1 (BF=0.11). There was no evidence for the underweighting or the 
overweighting of 0.05 (BF=0.11 and BF=1.25 respectively). 
For large probabilities as shown in Figure 8, under DFD, we found significant biases in 
weighting of probabilities 0.8, 0.9 and 0.95 significant (p=0.00 for all). The Bayes factors 
indicated very strong evidence for underweighting of 0.8, 0.9 and 0.95 (BF=0.00 for all). Under 
DFE, we found significant bias only at 0.8 (p=0.00). The Bayes factors suggested very strong 
evidence of underweighting of 0.8 (BF=0.00), strong evidence of underweighting 0.9 
(BF=0.06) and some evidence of underweighting 0.95 (BF=0.11). 
  Lastly, we examined the weighting of the moderate 0.5 probability. 38 out of 45 
subjects in the DFD treatment and 36 out of 43 subjects in the DFE treatment underweighted 
0.5. Hence, the deviations from unbiased weighting was highly significant at 0.5 in both 
treatments (p=0.00 for both treatments, two-sided binomial tests). The Bayes factors also 
indicated very strong evidence in favor of underweighting at 0.5 (BF<0.03 for both treatments).  
To summarize, while replicating the common inverse-S pattern under DFD, our 
aggregate data did not provide evidence for a reversal of inverse-S pattern under DFE. In 
particular, we did not observe significant deviations from unbiased weighting at extreme 
probabilities 0.05, 0.1, 0.9 and 0.95 under DFE. Notably, there was no convincing evidence for 
the underweighting of small probabilities 0.05 and 0.1, and there was more evidence for 
underweighting than overweighting at large probabilities. 
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Figure 7. Weighting of Small Probabilities 
 
Notes: p-values are for the two-sided binomial tests. Bayes factors (BF) indicate evidence for the null 
hypothesis that the probability is overweighted. Higher BF indicates higher support for overweighting 
of the given probability. The numbers above bars are the number of subjects who revealed the 
correspondent probability weighting patterns in choices.  
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Figure 8. Weighting of Large Probabilities 
 
Notes: p-values are for the two-sided binomial tests. Bayes factors (BF) indicate evidence for the null 
hypothesis that the probability is overweighted. Higher BF indicates higher support for overweighting 
of the given probability. The numbers above bars are the number of subjects who revealed the 
correspondent probability weighting patterns in choices.  
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Individual data. Next, we examine the shape of probability weighting functions at the 
individual level. We classify each subject’s probability weighting function as inverse S-shaped, 
S-shaped, pessimistic or optimistic based on the number of over – and under – weightings at 
three small and three large probabilities examined in Figures 7 and 8. Specifically, a probability 
weighting function is inverse S-shaped if it overweights at least two out of three small 
probabilities and underweights at least two out of three large probabilities, at the same time. 
An S-shaped probability weighting function is implied by the opposite pattern. Similarly, a 
pessimistic probability weighting function underweights at least two small and two large 
probabilities at the same time, and the opposite pattern implies an optimistic probability 
weighting function. 
 The classification results are in Table 2. The probability weighting functions were 
mainly classified as inverse S-shaped, S-shaped or pessimistic while the proportion of 
optimistic weighting functions was negligible in both treatments. Among the three main types, 
the majority of the probability weighting functions was inverse S-shaped in the DFD treatment 
(p=0.00, one-sided binomial, H0: Proportion of inverse S is  
1
3
 among inverse S, S and 
pessimistic types). The inverse S-shape was also the most frequent type in the DFE treatment 
but it was not the majority (p=0.13, one-sided binomial, H0: Proportion of inverse S is 
1
3
 among 
inverse S, S and pessimistic types).   
The comparison across the two treatments indicated that the proportion of S-shaped 
probability weighting functions was higher in the DFE treatment, although the difference was 
only marginally significant (p=0.08, two-sided Fisher’s exact test). There was no significant 
difference in the proportions of inverse S-shaped, pessimistic and optimistic probability 
weighting functions across the two treatments. 
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Table 2. Type of Probability Weighting Functions 
 Inverse S-shaped S-Shaped Pessimistic Optimistic 
DFD 51% (23) 9% (4) 36% (16) 4% (2) 
DFE 42% (18) 23% (10) 33% (14) 2% (1) 
Gap 9% (p=0.40) -14% (p=0.08) 3% (p=0.82) 2% (p=1) 
Notes: The number of probability weighting functions is given in the parenthesis. p-values are for the (two-sided) 
Fisher’s exact test.  
Overall, our individual level analysis suggested reduced, but persistent, inverse S 
pattern in the DFE treatment. The preceding results are valid without requiring any parametric 
assumptions or specification of the stochastic nature of errors. The parametric analysis in the 
next section supplements our nonparametric results. 
Parametric estimations. We made the parametric analysis of probability weighting 
functions by implementing Bayesian hierarchical estimation procedure. This procedure enables 
reliable aggregate and individual level estimations with limited data available per subject. It 
was recommended by Nilsson et al. (2011) and Scheibehenne & Pachur (2015), and employed 
by several other studies for estimating RDU and cumulative PT components (Balcombe & 
Fraser 2015; Kellen et al. 2016; Lejarraga et al. 2016).  
We estimated Goldstein & Einhorn’s (1987) weighting function given by  𝑤(𝑞) =
𝛽𝑞𝛼
𝛽𝑞𝛼+(1−𝑞)𝛼
. The parameter 𝛼 determines the curvature and captures the sensitivity towards 
changes in probabilities. Here, 𝛼 < 1 indicates inverse S-shape and likelihood insensitivity, 
and 𝛼 > 1  indicates S-shape and likelihood sensitivity. The parameter 𝛽  determines the 
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elevation, and captures the degree of pessimism. For 𝛽 = 1, we have 𝑤(0.5) = 0.5. Lower 
(higher) values of 𝛽  indicates less (more) elevation and more (less) pessimism. Following 
Kruschke (2011), we evaluate the credibility of likelihood insensitivity and pessimism based 
on the ranges of 95% intervals from posterior distribution of parameters. The details on 
estimation procedures are in Appendix C. 
We report the estimated group level mean parameters and corresponding 95% 
credibility intervals in Table 3. Figure 9 shows the estimated probability weighting functions. 
The estimated parameters indicated credible likelihood insensitivity and pessimism in both 
treatments as 𝛼 = 1 and 𝛽 = 1 fell on the right side of 95% credibility intervals. The DFE-
DFD gap in terms of likelihood insensitivity and pessimism was not credible, although the 
difference in likelihood insensitivity was suggestive. Hence, we observed a less pronounced 
inverse S-shape in the DFE weighting function, while the elevation was comparable across the 
two treatments (black curves in Figure 9).  
Table 3. Group level mean parameters 
 𝜶 𝜷 
DFD 
0.430  
[0.234, 0.675] 
0.407  
[0.259, 0.590] 
DFE 
0.611 
[0.372, 0.868] 
0.331  
[0.198, 0.508] 
Gap 
-0.181  
[-0.517, 0.160] 
0.076  
[-0.152, 0.304] 
Notes: Estimated parameters are the means of the posterior distributions of the group level means. 95% credibility intervals 
are given in square brackets.   
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At the individual level, pessimism (𝛽 < 1) was credible for all the subjects in both 
treatments.  Likelihood insensitivity was credible for 51% (23 out of 45) of the subjects in the 
DFD treatment and for 29% (13 out of 43) of the subjects in the DFE treatment. While there 
was no subject with likelihood sensitivity (𝛼 > 1) in the DFD treatment, 23% (10 out of 43) 
subjects in the DFE exhibited likelihood sensitivity, although it was never credible. These 
results confirmed our previous nonparametric results at the individual level.  
Figure 9. Probability weighting functions 
Notes: Blue/dashed curves are individual level probability weighting functions based on the means of individual level posterior 
distributions. Black curve is the group level probability weighting function based on the mean of the posterior distribution of 
the group level mean. 
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Discussion 
The Impact of Sampling Experience  
Our adjustment of the sampling paradigm with complete sampling of outcomes allowed 
us to observe the pure impact of sampling experience on risk attitudes. Both nonparametric and 
parametric analysis indicated that the sampling experience attenuates but does not reverse 
biases at extreme probabilities. Overall, our results suggested that sampling experience mainly 
attenuates likelihood insensitivity but it does not have much impact on pessimism towards risk. 
The de-biasing effect of sampling experience can be explained by two possible factors.  
First, the two informationally-identical treatments may suggest distinct cognitive processes for 
different information formats as argued by Gigerenzer & Hoffrage (1995). In particular, 
insensitivity to probabilities diminishes, similar to Bayesian updating, when the probabilistic 
information is acquired through sequential sampling in terms of natural frequencies. Other 
studies by Hogarth & Soyer (2011) and Hogarth et al. (2015) also emphasize the importance 
of the structure of the learning environment for reduction of biases in judgment and decision 
making. In particular, a kind learning environment, where the samples collected by the decision 
maker provide an accurate representation of the target population, is a necessary condition for 
unbiased judgments and choices. Our experimental design provides a kind learning 
environment in the absence of sampling biases and ambiguity.  
As regards the second factor, the DFE-DFD gap can signify other internal biases due to 
memory limitations and/or inattention (Camilleri & Newell 2011a). To avoid these potential 
confounds in our experiment, we provided our subjects with paper and pen and reminded them 
that they can keep track of the outcomes during the sampling stage in DFE. We observed that 
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more than half of the subjects in the DFE treatment took notes. Hence, our results were less 
likely to be driven by misremembering the past observations. 
Our conclusions on the impact of sampling experience on probability weighting are 
consistent with some previous findings.  Gottlieb et al. (2007), Hilbig & Glöckner (2011), and 
Humphrey (2006) also report reduced probability weighting with different variants of the 
sampling paradigm. Erev et al. (2015, problems 1,2,7 – 11), Jessup et al. (2008), van de Kuilen 
& Wakker (2006), and van de Kuilen (2009) report significant convergence to EU 
maximization under risk in repeated choice settings, when immediate feedback after each 
choice is available but not when it is unavailable. These results also suggest the distinct impact 
of experience in repeated choice settings (also see Lejarraga & Gonzalez 2011 on strong impact 
of experience).   
Two-Stage Design, Non-parametric and Parametric Analysis 
Our two stage experimental design avoided potential interdependencies between utility 
and probability weighting components of RDU, which was reported by previous studies. 
Moreover, it enabled a reliable non-parametric analysis of probability weighting functions 
without relying on specific functional forms, which can be subject to distortions. Our 
parametric estimations were consistent with our nonparametric analysis. To further test the 
descriptive adequacy of the parametric Bayesian estimations, we compared posterior 
predictions of the estimated model with the actual data observed (see Appendix C, Figure C2). 
The model was accurate in predicting choices.  
Despite the aforementioned advantages of the nonparametric approach, one might still 
have concerns about our two-stage design. One concern is the error propagation in the chained 
procedure. In particular, the stimulus for the measurement of probability weighting in the 
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second stage is determined based on the utilities elicited in the first stage. Thus, any error in 
calculation of 𝑠𝑞  from the first stage may result in a bias in probability weighting 
measurements. However, studies investigating this point have shown that this problem is 
indeed negligible (Abdellaoui et al. 2005; Bleichrodt and Pinto 2000). Moreover, high 
goodness of fit in estimations of utility functions, and the replication of common qualitative 
patterns of probability weighting under DFD confirm the validity of our procedure.  
Another concern is incentive compatibility of the TO method due to its adaptive nature 
(later stimuli being determined by previous choices). However, no previous studies have found 
this to be a problem in experiments (Abdelloui 2000; Bleichrodt et al. 2010; Qiu & Steiger 
2011; Schunk & Betsch 2006; van de Kuilen & Wakker 2011). Hence, in the terminology of 
Bardsley et al. (2010), there is only a concern for theoretical incentive compatibility but not for 
behavioral incentive compatibility (pp. 265). Still, as a precautionary measure, our bisection 
procedure also included filler questions in the iteration process, aiming to make the detection 
of our adaptive design even more difficult. Our data did not show any evidence of strategic 
choices (appendix B). 
Lastly, our experimental design makes an implicit assumption that the sampling 
experience has an impact on the probability domain but not on utilities. This assumption was 
supported by some previous studies (Abdellaoui et al. 2011b; Glockner et al. 2016; 
Kopsacheilis 2016; but also see Kellen et al. 2016), and enabled us to measure utilities under 
the more efficient DFD paradigm in the first stage.   
Conclusion 
This paper clarifies the controversy about the DFE-DFD gap. Our strictly controlled 
sampling paradigm isolates the impact of the sampling experience from other confounds, and 
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the rigorous two stage design reveals the exact weighting of probabilities under DFE. The 
experimental findings support the DFE-DFD gap. However, the gap does not amount to a 
reversal of the inverse S-shaped probability weighting, and there is no actual underweighting 
of rare and extreme outcomes in DFE. Our findings illustrate the importance of the learning 
experience in reducing irrationalities. Decisions from experience do not reverse an irrationality 
into another irrationality but rather reduce the cognitive impairment of likelihood insensitivity. 
Black swans are not ignored under DFE. 
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Appendix A: Derivation of the Standard Sequence of Outcomes in TO Method 
Under RDU, indifferences  𝑥𝑖+1𝑝𝑔 ~ 𝑥𝑖𝑝𝐺 imply 𝑤(𝑝)𝑈(𝑥𝑖+1) + (1 − 𝑤(𝑝))𝑈(𝑔) =
𝑤(𝑝)𝑈(𝑥𝑖) + (1 − 𝑤(𝑝))𝑈(𝐺). A rearrangement of this equation shows 𝑈(𝑥𝑖+1) − 𝑈(𝑥𝑖) =
(1−𝑤(𝑝))
𝑤(𝑝)
[𝑈(𝐺) − 𝑈(𝑔)] for all 0 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 − 1. Because the right hand side of the equation is 
fixed by the design, the indifferences result in  𝑈(𝑥1) − 𝑈(𝑥0) = 𝑈(𝑥2) − 𝑈(𝑥1) = ⋯ =
𝑈(𝑥𝑛−1) − 𝑈(𝑥𝑛). 
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Appendix B: Bisection Procedure 
The iteration process serves to measure 𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, 𝑥4,  and 𝑥5   from the following 
indifferences, with 𝑝 = 0.33, 𝐺 = 17, 𝑔 = 9, 𝑥0 = 24: 
𝑥0𝑝𝐺~ 𝑥1𝑝𝑔, 𝑥1𝑝𝐺 ~ 𝑥2𝑝𝑔, 𝑥2𝑝𝐺 ~ 𝑥3𝑝𝑔, 𝑥3𝑝𝐺 ~ 𝑥4𝑝𝑔, 𝑥4𝑝𝐺 ~ 𝑥5𝑝𝑔 
For each 𝑥𝑖 , it took five choice questions to reach the indifference point. Subjects 
always chose between two prospects: 𝑥𝑖𝑝𝑔 and 𝑥𝑖−1𝑝𝐺 for 𝑖 = 1, … ,5. The procedure was as 
follows. 
1. The initial value of 𝑥𝑖 was determined as 𝑥𝑖−1 + 4(𝐺 − 𝑔) = 𝑥𝑖−1 + 32. 
2. 𝑥𝑖  was increased by a given step size when  𝑥𝑖−1𝑝𝐺  was chosen over 𝑥𝑖𝑝𝑔 , and 
decreased when 𝑥𝑖𝑝𝑔 was chosen over 𝑥𝑖−1𝑝𝐺 as long as 𝑥𝑖 > 𝑥𝑖−1. In case 𝑥𝑖 ≤ 𝑥𝑖−1, 
𝑥𝑖 was increased in order to ensure outcome monotonicity.       
3. The initial step was 4(𝐺 − 𝑔) =32. The step sizes were halved after each choice.  
4. The indifference point was reached after five choices.    
5. The largest possible value of 𝑥𝑖 was 𝑥𝑖−1 + 32 + 32 + 16 + 8 + 4 + 2 = 𝑥𝑖−1 + 94.  
6. The smallest possible value of 𝑥𝑖 was 𝑥𝑖−1 + 32 − 32 + 16 − 8 − 4 − 2 = 𝑥𝑖−1 + 2. 
The fourth term on the left hand side (+16) ensured the outcome monotonicity (see 
point 2). 
One concern for the TO method and the bisection iteration process is the incentive 
compatibility due to the adaptive design. A subject who is fully aware of the adaptive design 
can strategically drive the value 𝑥𝑖 upwards by pretending to be extremely risk averse in the 
bisection questions. In this way, he or she can increase the expected values of prospects in the 
subsequent questions for the elicitation of 𝑥𝑖+1. To make it more difficult for our subjects to 
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fully grasp the process, we included two filler questions in the iteration process of each 𝑥𝑖. The 
two filler choices were after the first and the third choice questions for every 𝑥𝑖 . In these 
questions, 𝑥𝑖 was changed in the direction that is opposite to the changes described in point 2 
above. These questions had no further impact on the flow of the procedure.  
Our data did not suggest any strategic behavior. While an awareness of the adaptive 
design from the outset is fairly unlikely, learning during the experiment would lead to 
increasing distances between 𝑥𝑖s. This means that a systematic learning of the strategic choice 
during the experiment would give us larger distances between 𝑥5  and  𝑥4  than between 𝑥1 
and 𝑥0. On the contrary, the median distances in our data were 26 and 34 respectively, and did 
not differ significantly (Wilcoxon sign-rank, p-value=0.54).  
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Appendix C: Bayesian Hierarchical Estimation Procedure 
We implemented Bayesian hierarchical estimation procedure as follows. The Goldstein 
& Einhorn’s (1987) probability weighting function is 𝑤(𝑞) =
𝛽𝑞𝛼
𝛽𝑞𝛼+(1−𝑞)𝛼
. The probability of 
choosing the risky prospect was calculated using Luce’s (1959) stochastic choice function, 
which gave a better fit to our data than the logit function. It is Pr (𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) =
𝑅𝐷𝑈𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦
𝜎
𝑅𝐷𝑈𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦
𝜎 +𝑅𝐷𝑈𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒
𝜎 , where 𝜎 is the noise parameter. After normalizing 𝑈(𝑥1) = 0, and 𝑈(𝑥5) =
1; 𝑅𝐷𝑈𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦 = 𝑤(𝑞) ∗ 𝑈(𝑥5) + (1 − 𝑤(𝑞)) ∗ 𝑈(𝑥1) = 𝑤(𝑞), and 𝑅𝐷𝑈𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 = 𝑈(𝑥𝑞) = 𝑞 by 
construction. Thus, the choice function implies random choice when  𝑤(𝑞) = 𝑞, consistent 
with (3) in the Method section.  
In the estimations, prior distributions of individual level parameters 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 were set 
to uniform distributions. The ranges of the uniform distributions were from 0.1 to 2 for 𝛼𝑖 and 
from 0.1 to 1.5 for 𝛽𝑖. The range chosen for 𝛼𝑖 allows a wide array of curvatures ranging from 
strong inverse S-shape to strong S-shape. The range chosen for  𝛽𝑖  implies that 𝑤(0.5)  is 
between 
1
11
 and 
3
5
, which is considered as a reasonable range given the previous findings in the 
literature and our nonparametric results suggesting strong underweighting at 0.5.  Group level 
parameters were linked to individual level parameters through probit tranformations and linear 
linkages (see Nilsson et al. 2011; Scheibehenne & Pachur 2015). Group level means were 
assumed to follow standard normal distribution so that the individual level parameters had 
uniform distributions. Group level standard deviations were uniformly distributed ranging from 
0 to 10. The individual level noise parameters 𝜎𝑖 were assumed to come from a lognormal 
distribution.  The log-normal group mean for 𝜎  was assumed to be uniformly distributed 
ranging from 0.1 to 10. The lognormal standard deviation for 𝜎 was uniformly distributed 
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ranging from 0 to 1.33. The upper bound of 1.33 was the standard deviation of the transformed 
uniform distribution 𝑈(ln(0.1) , ln(10)), following Nilsson et al. (2011, pg. 88).  
 The MCMC algorithm was implemented in WinBUGS run through R software. Three 
chains, each with 60000 iterations were run, after a burn-in of 10000 iterations. To reduce the 
autocorrelation, only every 10th sample was recorded. Convergence was checked by Gelman-
Rubin statistics, and by visual inspection of trace plots.  
Figure C1 shows the posterior histograms for the group level mean parameters. Figure 
C2 shows the predictive performance of the estimations by comparing the median numbers of 
overweighting predicted by the posterior distributions of group level parameters with the actual 
numbers of overweighting observed in our data. The model predictions match with the 
observed data for 0.2 and 0.9 in the DFD treatment, and for 0.05 and 0.1 in the DFE treatment. 
The predictions for the other probabilities were close to the actual data in the DFE treatment. 
The predictions for 0.05 and 0.8 in the DFD treatment indicated some misalignment with the 
actual data, although they performed well in the rest of the probabilities.         
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Figure C1. Posterior histograms for group level means 
Figure C2. Posterior predictions based on group level parameters 
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